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The purpose of this study is to examine the efficacy of various policy options for curbing the accumulation of illegal wealth and suggest ways to close the increasing wealth inequality gap.

The paper begins with a historical/literary analysis of the place of wealth in American Society and the ambivalent cultural attitudes toward wealth. Different policy approaches that seek to limit wealth inequality and the illegal accumulation of wealth are then examined. Finally, the current policy climate in the USA is reviewed to determine the likelihood of meaningful reform.

In Europe, the BASEL accords show promise for curbing the illegal accumulation of wealth by politically exposed persons. In the USA, tax reform efforts can close the wealth gap, but the current political landscape makes meaningful reform challenging particularly given the increasing use of “dark” money to influence elections.

Because financial reform is a moving target in both Europe and the USA, subject to the ebb and flow of political forces, it is difficult to predict what major reforms will be possible.

Without meaningful reform, an increase in populist movements can be expected (e.g. Brexit and Trump) with an overall, long-term negative impact on democratic capitalism.

The wealth gap and the sense that the system is rigged against the common people will result in increasing political turmoil.

Combining literary/historical analysis with the analysis of current policy interventions provides a set of tools not usually used in the examination of financial crimes.

Efforts to combat corruption in society often seem to resemble a game of whack-a-mole. When dealt with in one sector of the society, it pops up in another, and while that is being dealt with, it again raises its ugly head in the place where it had appeared to be suppressed. This paper aims to present a model of how corruption spreads based on an alternative view of its main components.

Key elements of the model are analyzed by applying them to particular examples of systemic ethical failures using a variety of mini cases across a number of policy areas.

Corruption is based on conformity rather than rule breaking. Furthermore, personal or corporate gains are not sufficient as causes of ethically problematic actions. More fundamentally, survival of the organizational enterprise is the driving force in spreading corrupt behavior.

This paper concludes with a discussion of the model’s efficacy for formulating legislative solutions for ethical lapses in a particular policy area. Again, a mini cases study is used to illustrate the main points of the argument.

Viewing systemic ethical failures through this alternative lens may well result in more effective ways to combat the spread of corrupt practices.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the reasons why some financial crises do not result in extensive criminal prosecutions.

The authors examine three major events: the crash of 1929 leading to the Great Depression, the collapse of the US Savings and Loan industry circa 1990 and the sub-prime mortgage meltdown. The authors explain how circumstances surrounding these financial collapses led to stark differences in criminal prosecutions.

This review of prosecutions during three financial crises underscores the contingent nature of seeking criminal penalties for financial wrongdoing. The decision is influenced by a number of factors, including a prosecutor’s level of risk tolerance (probable win test); the potential economic impact of a successful conviction; the number of laws and regulations available in the prosecutorial tool kit; and the desired outcome which can range from new regulatory structures, to prosecutions that fix blame and satisfy the desire for scapegoats, to seeking financial penalties that shore up the government’s bottom line.

This study covers three crises and focuses on the US responses. A broader study could look across countries.

Regulators and lawmakers are interested in avoiding future crises. Because crises are not anticipated, responses are determined by conditions of the moment. A frequent result is that laws and regulations are not in place. Decisions about likely preferred responses would allow anticipatory legislation and regulations.

Financial crises obviously have major implications for ordinary citizens far removed from the centers of finance. Improved responses to mitigate or avoid disasters would have profound impacts on people’s quality of life.

The three crises have been studied individually. This work is different in that it examines the impact of a common set of factors over three crises covering a span of 80 years.

While the “Information Age” has provided the technological tools to “democratize” data and make it widely available to a vast audience of knowledge consumers, ironically it has also provided the materials for a tapestry of rules, regulations and processes that make it more difficult for individuals to access information relevant to both their public and private lives. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of the private sector in the control and policing of financial crime, and provide an empirical and theoretical framework for understanding the complex tensions created by the simultaneous expansion of both data sources and technologies to collect and format data to create marketable information “products.”

Three primary methods were used to gather the data for this research. Extensive literature reviews were conducted together with an analysis of existing data bases. Finally, a number of interviews were done with various corporate managers to ascertain their views of the existing climate of regulation and/or to determine their approach to monitoring financial crime.

Regarding the private sector's role in the control of financial crime, this research found five distinct roles; each with its own dynamics and implications for successful suppression of unlawful conduct. The five roles are grudging informant, enthusiastic intelligence operative, agent provocateur, cop on the take, and officer friendly. A calculus of incentives and disincentives determines which role will be adopted by the private sector.

Since this paper was exploratory in nature, resulting in a new taxonomy of compliance types, more in depth research ascertaining the empirical validity of each type would be in order. Such knowledge can help policy makers formulate rules and regulations that will enhance public/private partnerships in the control of financial crime.

Outlines the requirements of the PATRIOT Act of October 2001; together with subsequent legislation, it has led to a dramatic increase in surveillance activities affecting both traditional financial institutions and the newer types known as Money Service Businesses. Lists its demands, that all financial institutions: establish a more formal anti‐money laundering programme with a compliance officer, implement an employee training programme, file Suspicious Activity Reports, verify new customers’ identities etc. Indicates the cost to the financial services industry of compliance. Concludes that, given the massive quantities of information collected, even the best technology may not ensure that the tiny minority of terrorist traces actually get followed up

The desirability of financial reform to avoid another financial melt‐down is widely accepted, but the likelihood of reform is uncertain. The purpose of this paper is to present a case study of evolution and reform attempts at US mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and provides an instructive model of the likely long‐term success of attempts to reform the financial system.

A model of the legislative and regulatory change process is first developed, considering the range of influences that arise. The history of reform attempts for US government sponsored mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are examined in the context of this model.

The model predicts that reform will often be thwarted. US government sponsored mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac helped fuel the housing bubble and required a government bail‐out. Sentiment for reform was high, but what happened next was – nothing. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have a long history of successful lobbying, and they succeeded again. They did not need to stop legislation. They needed only to see it delayed long enough for attention to turn elsewhere. Five years after the bubble broke, their market dominance and the implied guarantees continue. Reform is not on the legislative agenda. This outcome does not bode well for financial market reform or stability.

An understanding of the process, influences, and likelihood of reform is important for governments, businesses, and individuals. While the picture this paper paints is not optimistic, it is important.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the legislative process, in order to determine the likely effectiveness of financial reform efforts in the USA.

Case study of the legislative process, particularly the less visible parts such as rule making, that shaped the passage and implementation of the Dodd‐Frank Act and the failed Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) reform.

It is found that the process of financial reform legislation is structured in such a way as to thwart major reform, at least in the short run.

The passage of a particular piece of legislation may be the least important element in the process of reform. Rule making and the decisions as to how a law will be implemented, can advance or significantly defeat the quest for change.

Much of what occurs in the legislative process is invisible, or appears arcane, to the ordinary citizen but can have major impact on their lives.

The paper provides a road map to understanding the least visible parts of financial reform efforts and suggests ways of achieving reform outcomes.

This paper aims to address the question of who gained and who lost in the financial crisis of 2008.

Gains and losses were identified by groups ranging from bankers to homeowners to taxpayers.

Gains and losses are not neatly split by a main street/Wall street dichotomy. Major financial institutions and their chief executive officers made huge gains followed by bigger losses, a substantial portion of which were shared by taxpayers. Homeowners and taxpayers consistently lost. Workers and real estate developers experienced a mixture of gains and losses.

Financial legislation is affected by questions of who won and who lost. The complex mixture of gains and losses must be fully grasped if winners and losers are an important consideration in the design of legislation.

The detailed analysis and model of winners and losers provide important lessons for legislators and regulators in all countries.

To respond to the COVID-19 “infodemic” and combat fraud and misinformation about the virus, social media platforms coordinated with government healthcare agencies around the world to elevate authoritative content about the novel coronavirus. These public health authorities included national and global public health organisations, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the World Health Organisation (WHO). In this article, the authors evaluate the effectiveness of this strategy by asking two key questions: (1) Did people engage with authoritative health content on social media? (2) Was this content trusted?

The authors explore these issues by drawing on data from a global online questionnaire on “Public Trust in Experts” (n = 429) conducted during the initial phase of the pandemic in May 2020, a crucial period when reliable information was urgently required to influence behaviour and minimise harm.

The authors found that while the majority of those surveyed noticed authoritative health content online, there remained significant issues in terms of Internet users trusting the information shared by government healthcare agencies and public health authorities online.

In what follows, the authors examine the role of trust in implementing this novel public health strategy and assess the capacity for such policies to reduce individual and social harm.

The peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/OIR-12-2021-0655